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Therefore, following the September 11 attacks, the
Bush administration argued that the successful
formation of democracy in Iraq would serve as an
example to other Middle Eastern states. For one,
it would provide a warning that the creation of a
functioning market democracy in the region is
possible, even through the use of force by an
outside power. Additionally, by transforming Iraq
from a country ruled by a dictator to one ruled by
a democratically elected government, Washington
hoped that citizens of autocratic states in the
region would no longer stand by obediently while
they were forced to obey an unpopular and
autocratic regime.
While this was an important motive behind the
intervention in Iraq, it has now lost the support
of Washington policymakers, in addition to many
insiders within the Bush administration. The
reason behind this loss of support has been the
continuous failure to transform Iraq into a market
democracy. While it is still possible to arrest
Iraq's present downward trend, until that moment
occurs there will be little support for further
test cases of democratic transformation in the
Middle East.
Democratic transformation With the 2000
election win of President George W Bush, the
administration appointed a select few individuals
among the neo-conservative class of the American
political spectrum. These officials - with the
most prominent neo-conservative represented by
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz - were
branded with a certain sense of idealism,
believing that a democratic transformation of the
Middle East was very possible through outside
intervention, explaining why this political class
has been labeled "democratic
imperialists".
For example, before the invasion of Iraq began,
influential members of the American Enterprise
Institute - one of the leading institutions of
neo-conservative thought - released repeated
statements arguing the positive effects that an
invasion of Iraq would bring. Joshua Muravchik, a
resident scholar at the Institute, stated in
August 2002, "Change toward democratic
regimes in Tehran and Baghdad would unleash a
tsunami across the Islamic world."
In September 2002, Michael Ledeen, a freedom
scholar with the institute, called for the US to
begin "a vast democratic revolution to
liberate all the peoples of the Middle East".
Ledeen succinctly argued the critical point of
this theory, announcing that "it is
impossible to imagine that the Iranian people
would tolerate tyranny in their own country once
freedom had come to Iraq. Syria would follow in
short order." Bush himself stated in his 2004
state of the union address that "... we will
finish the historic work of democracy in
Afghanistan and Iraq, so those nations can light
the way for others, and help transform a troubled
part of the world."
Theoretically, a democratic transformation of
the Middle East could occur following the
successful implantation of a market democracy
there. However, the reason that this theory is
hinged too much on idealism is that it exaggerates
the ability of an outside power to create such a
structure. Furthermore, the difference in culture
and values between the implanting power - the US -
and the recipient states - predominately of
Islamic culture - also works negatively against
the success of such a theory.
Iraq: The first test case These doubts were
manifested in the US intervention of Iraq. While
it only took weeks to eliminate the Ba'athist
regime, many months have passed and there is still
little stability throughout the country. Indeed,
there is no evidence to definitively state whether
progress is being made or lost. According to US
senator Lincoln Chafee, who just returned from
Iraq, and a member of the Bush administration's
Republican Party, the situation has become worse
in the last year. Speaking to CNN, Chafee said,
"It's a very tenuous security situation. I'd
been there a year ago - what a change ... in the
Green Zone a year ago we felt very secure. Not so
this time."
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has also
questioned the viability of the Iraq intervention.
The New York Times reported on December 7 that it
had received a classified cable from the CIA's
station chief in Baghdad warning that the security
situation in Iraq will soon deteriorate further
unless some major successes are scored.
Until it can be determined whether progress is
being made or lost in Iraq, the intervention will
do nothing to encourage other Middle Eastern
political leaders and citizens to push for a
democratic transformation in their countries;
indeed, as of now, it has done the very opposite
and has demonstrated the potential anarchy that
can erupt following the weakening of a central
government or the creation of a temporary power
vacuum.
Furthermore, the intervention of Iraq
demonstrated the political, military and economic
toll that can affect the US negatively if an
intervention goes awry.
For instance, while the Bush administration won
the 2004 presidential election, it has lost a lot
of support from the American people, and the
population itself is split almost evenly into two
political camps. Much of this national divergence
can be blamed on the impact of the Iraq
intervention to both the US military and economy.
The US has lost over 1,000 soldiers in Iraq,
and it has been forced to keep over 100,000 troops
in the country, with the total troop commitment
presently hovering around 150,000. This sort of
troop obligation has stretched the US military to
the point where its present global commitment is
simply unsustainable. The ramifications of the
extended troop commitment to Iraq are already
evident, seen through the May 2004 decision to
withdraw an army brigade from the US Army's 2nd
Infantry Division in South Korea to Iraq.
Finally, the funds required to sustain present
operations in Iraq are exorbitant, helping to
swell the US budget deficit to US$413 billion.
Over the long term, continued high spending in
Iraq could bring economic problems, such as an
extended trade deficit and high inflation.
All of these factors explain how the
intervention of Iraq has given the US little
ability to engage in future interventions, whether
for another test of democratic transformation or
even for legitimate national security concerns.
The troop commitment and financial costs being
usurped by the Iraq intervention have weakened the
ability of the US to project its power in the
world.
If the Bush administration were to have
seriously considered all the likely scenarios
involved in the intervention in Iraq - including
worst case scenarios - it is doubtful that it
would have carried through with the invasion. The
success of the neo-conservative vision of
democratic transformation hinged on the
realization of a best-case scenario, which was a
reality that failed to occur. As clearly argued by
Wolfowitz before the invasion, "I am
reasonably certain that they will greet us as
liberators, and that will help us to keep [troop]
requirements down."
Instead, the US hasn't yet had the luxury to
work on a true democratic transformation in Iraq
because it is still trying to foster some sort of
stability in the country. As stated by retired
army Colonel Raoul Alcala, who served as an
advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense,
"Plan A - what the US actually did - failed,
and Plan B - the adaptations since the end of
'major combat' - hasn't worked either, so
far." This leaves the US in the awkward
position of not being able to resort to a viable
military and political strategy.
Retreat from the transformation theory The Bush
administration's retreat from its vision of a
transformation to market democracy for Middle
Eastern states is evident in the lead-up to the
December 11 summit meeting in Morocco intended to
promote democracy across the region. US officials
have made clear that they will not demand the
region's leaders to reform, instead coming with a
package of financial and social initiatives -
plans that will not create much discomfort in the
region's autocracies. Middle East analysts Tamara
Cofman Wittes and Sarah Yerkes of the Brookings
Institution point to the problems of this
strategy, "Economic reform is something for
which nearly all Arab governments are willing to
accept assistance, regardless of the donor, but
whether economic change can contribute to the
degree of liberalization that the United States
sees as necessary to reduce political extremism is
uncertain."
Discussing the upcoming meeting, US Secretary
of State Colin Powell said in a radio interview
that he hoped the Middle Eastern states attending
the Morocco summit meeting would "come to an
understanding of the need for reform and
modernization in the broader Middle East and North
Africa region". This is far from the
administration's stance in January of 2004, when
Bush announced, "As long as the Middle East
remains a place of tyranny and despair and anger,
it will continue to produce men and movements that
threaten the safety of America and our friends. So
America is pursuing a forward strategy of freedom
in the greater Middle East. We will challenge the
enemies of reform, confront the allies of terror,
and expect a higher standard from our
friend."
Conclusion One of the prime motives for the
intervention in Iraq was to test the
neo-conservative theory of democratic
transformation in the Middle East. This theory's
chance for success was questionable from the very
beginning, since there are few historical examples
of an outside power intervening in a country with
vast cultural differences and successfully
implementing a market democracy there.
Additionally, Iraq was a very poor choice for the
execution of this theory to begin with,
considering that the country has never settled the
question of how power will be shared between its
three main ethnic/religious groups (Shi'ite, Sunni
and Kurd); creating a power vacuum in such a state
is a sure way to pull the intervening power into
the center of civil strife and potential civil
war.
The Bush administration and the US have
discovered all of these difficulties in Iraq and
are struggling to create some sense of stability.
The overbearing cost of the Iraq intervention - in
terms of political, military and economic costs -
has demanded the full attention of the Bush
administration, and it is unrealistic to expect
the administration to push for further democratic
transformations elsewhere in the region.
Instead, the administration can be expected to
cut its geostrategic losses and try to preserve
the gains it has made. A retreat from Iraq would
be a devastating development to the image of the
US in the eyes of its detractors, and would likely
act as a huge boon for al-Qaeda's recruitment
ability, similar to the effect that resulted from
the Islamist victory over the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan. It would also have the potential of
weakening US power in the world, although this
could be easily prevented by strong shows of force
by the US in regional hotspots.
Nevertheless, because retreat carries such
negative connotations, the Bush administration
will isolate itself from policies that have as
their potential outcome further political,
military and economic pressure brought to bear on
the US. For the time being, and until conditions
turn favorably in Iraq, the Bush administration
can be expected to shelve any serious designs at
democratic transformation in the Middle East.
ORIGINAL
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